Escalation or Restraint?

Israel after October 7^th is very different from what it was before.

The Israeli public has realized that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s strategy of “supporting” Hamas these past few years to weaken the Palestinian Authority has backfired. As well, its concentration on missile defense, although hugely successful, left it vulnerable to a surprise guerrilla attack the likes of which resulted in the most deaths of Israelis on a single day since its founding.

Since the attacks, Israel’s massive retaliation has killed many Gazans and resulted in global opposition to Israel’s objective of destroying Hamas once and for all.

On April 8^th, Israel destroyed a consulate building annexed to the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing seven Iranian Revolutionary Guards, including two senior generals responsible for logistical support to Hezbollah and Hamas. It is important to note that all of these officials were militarily engaged in supporting Hamas and Hezbollah in attacking Israel making them fair targets.

Nevertheless, and as expected, Iran retaliated on April 13^th with an unprecedented and massive drone, ballistic and cruise missile attack. Israeli defences with U.S. Saudi, Jordanian, and UK aerial support help knocked down 99% of these projectiles.

Now the world awaits what will happen next.

Both sides have advantages over the other.

Iran has two formidable allies along Israel’s borders: Hezbollah and Hamas. They can attack Israel at will with no collateral damage to Iran as Hamas proved in October.

Israel unfortunately has no allies along Iran’s borders that could serve as a launch pad for an Israeli ground attack. While it is technologically more advanced than Iran, anti-missile defenses on both sides have created a stalemate of sorts in that method of warfare.

Israel’s much vaunted ground forces cannot attack Iran since Israel has no allies bordering Iran from which to mount at attack or invasion.

This leaves Israel with three options to eliminate Iran’s advantage on the ground and level the playing field: aerial attacks on Iran, infiltration by Mossad internally in Iran, or ground attacks on Iran’s allies in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

Given the existential nature of the threats against it, Israel has no strategic choice but to sacrifice global public opinion and destroy Hamas entirely. As former Prime Minister Golda Meir once said, “If we have to have a choice between being dead and pitied, and being alive with a bad image, we’d rather be alive and have the bad image.”

Israel also must also encourage anti-Hezbollah forces in Lebanon to attack this terrorist organization in a ground attack coordinated with Israeli forces to destroy the terrorists’ ability to continue to attack Israel.

Global condemnation of Iran’s attack has been forthcoming. But Israel’s main ally, the United States, has warned Israel that it will not support an escalation of a war with Iran – thus drawing a red line.

Herein lies another Israeli advantage. During the Iranian barrage other countries in the region, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, assisted Israel in tracking Iran’s projectiles.

Indeed, the region fears Iranian expansion.

Can Israel produce a coalition by which these countries would support Israel in its strategy of destroying Iran’s allies along its borders thus reducing their common enemy’s ability to destabilize the region?

That Arab neighbours came to Israel’s aid marks a tectonic shift in the region’s balance of power and demonstrates that Israel is not alone in confronting Iran. Can Israel work with those governments to eliminate Iran’s allies?

In terms of next steps, Israeli officials would be well advised to recall the old French saying that revenge is a plate best served cold.

Messages coming out of Teheran indicate that the situation is over and that both sides now have a face-saving way to deescalate. President Biden told Prime Minister Netanyahu to “take the win” and resist escalating since the U.S. will not commit to supporting Israeli aggression against Iran for fear of unleashing a broader conflict.

If I were advising the Israelis, I would stress this message and encourage them to pursue Iran’s proxies – Hamas and Hezbollah – finish the job in Gaza with a viable plan for “the day after” and go after Hezbollah with anti-Hezbollah Lebanese and regional allies who would like to reclaim Lebanon from this terrorist organization.

The question now is, would Israel listen, and would anti-Hezbollah Lebanese forces participate?