Trump and Latin America

by Eduardo del Buey

Trump and Latin America

Latin America faces a possible cataclysmic situation because of Donald Trump’s electoral victory on November 5th.

Forty years of bilateral and multilateral experience in the region leads me to conclude that the history of political incompetence and personal and institutional corruption on the part of the Latin America’s political, economic, social, and military leaders will leave the region incapable of successfully managing the situation and that the region will suffer accordingly.

This chaos that could well ensue will come at a significant cost to the security and economy of the United States, and the consequences could be serious.

Donald Trump comes to power on the basis of three key electoral promises that he appears intent on fully honoring: the deportation of undocumented Latin Americans (who now number some twelve million), the destruction of the drug cartels that currently rule the region in partnership with many political leaders and that contribute to crime and drug distribution in the U.S., and the destruction of the leftist dictatorships in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

Let’s explore.

The deportation of millions of Latin Americans from the United States will produce a challenge for Latin American governments and economies that lack the infrastructure to absorb them.

These millions will arrive in a region where unemployment is high and social welfare benefits are nonexistent. Most societies in Latin America depend on remittances from their nationals living in the United States, and thousands of towns throughout the region depend on these fully for their survival.

In 2022, these remittances amounted to over US$150 billion per annum, much of them sent by the very undocumented workers who face deportation. These funds represent a significant portion of the GDP of many Latin American countries.

The loss of this income, together with the influx of millions into already dysfunctional economies, will lead to much higher crime rates and leave those affected with no alternative but to join the very criminal and drug cartels that the Trump administration seeks to eliminate.

With respect to the war on cartels, Latin American governments have a history of negotiating with them in order to remain in office, and these partnerships will come under attack with the Trump administration’s war.

The Trump administration faces a well-armed and well-entrenched criminal class in Latin America that will fight to retain its power, and the cost in U.S. and Latin American lives will be high.

As well, much information about the historical collusion between U.S. government and security officials as well as members of the Latin American ruling classes with the cartels could well unleash a crisis of confidence that will make it impossible for anyone to lead Latin American countries effectively and credibly.

The impact on U.S. politicians and security officials on both sides of the aisle also could be highly disruptive. Those who have colluded do, in many cases, still occupy important positions in the U.S. administration and justice system, and their unmasking could well lead to a political crisis in the U.S.

This leads me to the Trump administration’s third regional objective – to rid Latin America of the left-wing dictatorships in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

This has been the main objective of Trump’s expected choice for Secretary of State Marco Rubio and will be the goal of the administration as it works to solidify its political hold on the Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Cuban diasporas whose millions have been forced to live as refugees in the United States as well as many Latin American countries.

These diasporas voted overwhelmingly for the Trump ticket, and they now expect their just rewards.

These three dictatorships have military and security forces that basically own all the state enterprises that constitute their economies. As well, the leaders of the three and their coteries are deeply involved in the drug trade.

Replacing them will require a massive financial investment by Western countries to help create economies that can absorb the millions returning to their shores as well as marginalize the tens of thousands of corrupt military and police officials who could likely form fifth columns.

In addition, their Russian, Iranian, and Islamist allies could well take a variety of actions not only against the newly installed governments but also against U.S. interests in the region and elsewhere in retaliation for the disruption that U.S. action will create for their financial and geopolitical interests.

The Trump administration has some allies among Latin American governments.

Argentina’s Javier Milei is staunchly anti-communist and pro-Trump. He is currently applying tough economic policies to a population that has historically been victim of its decisions to elect incompetent governments that espoused poor political, asocial, and economic policies that were based in an antiquated ideology with no regards for common sense.

Mr. Milei must achieve some success in the short term if his vision and policies are to provide a credible alternative to what currently exists.

El Salvador’s President Bukele has had major successes in ridding the country of the gangs that held the population hostage – an example of what the Trump administration wants to achieve in the U.S. and the region.

San Salvador has gone from being the murder capital of Latin America to being one of the safest cities in the region.

Mr. Bukele has accomplished this not by adhering to orthodox democratic politics that often appear to reward criminals in the name of human rights, but by applying what many consider to be common sense measures that make democracy and human rights secondary to the lives and security of his citizens. A large majority of Salvadoreans appreciate the significant results of his common-sense approach and his determination to not bend a knee before an international community that sees things differently.

Donald Trump and his team have never been fans of democratic or legal niceties and will find in Mr. Bukele a useful model of leadership to sell to the rest of the region.

Finally, undocumented Latin American immigrants pay some $96 billion in taxes in the United States. These revenues will cease once these immigrants are deported.

As well, they work primarily in agriculture and food production ¡industries -- activities that keep food costs low. Their departure from the economy will undoubtedly lead to increases in food costs across the board and create a sense of disappointment with a president who campaigned on lower costs for consumers.

The economic and social costs to Latin American countries whose economies are dependent on remittances will be enormous.

However, the impact of these social disruptions will directly affect U.S. investments and security interests in the region as well as the $96 billion dollars the Treasury will lose with the deportation of the Latin American undocumented migrants and concomitant impact of higher costs for food and other consumer staples.

Does the Trump administration understand the impact of its policies on regional political, social, and security dynamics of the region its policies will unleash, and has it factored the possible negative effects on American interests at home and abroad into its thinking?

I hope so.